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I
INTRODUCTION

Asked to resolve a social issue, Americans today turn readily to rights 1 and
to the Constitution that is understood to embody them. Many "vice" issues
have long been thought particularly apt for a rights analysis. A constitutional
resolution of vice issues is therefore inevitably a possibility, and its wisdom is
inevitably a question. In this essay, I want to address that question by
investigating an area of the law that has been recently constitutionalizedfamily law. Family law is an example worth studying because rights thinking
has won a considerable prominence in it: The Constitution has been used to
transform some major aspects of family law and to cast a shadow on many
others. In addition, rights thinking of a more general kind-influenced by
constitutional ideas, but not exclusively constitutional-has come to shape
much thought, legal and lay, about both family law and family life. Family law
has not only had illuminating experience with rights thinking and
constitutionalization; its experience has been with the most relevant form of
each. For if vice issues are constitutionalized, it probably will be through the
doctrinal framework of fourteenth amendment "privacy" rights developed
and applied in family law cases. 2
Copyright © 1988 by Law and Contemporary Problems
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I am grateful to Philip Cook, Edward Cooper,
Walter E. Dellinger, Alfred A. DeSimone, Marie Deveney, Jerold H. Israel, Robert F. Nagel,
Frederick Schauer, Dorothy Schneider, Joan W. Schneider, Jerome Skolnick, Lee Teitelbaum, and
Maris Vinovskis for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
I. See, e.g.. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GEo. L. REv. 917 (1985); Westen, The Rueful
Rhetoric of "Rights,'' 33 UCLA L. REv. 977 (1986).
2. Indeed, to some extent I will be directly discussing "vice" issues or issues (like abortion)
which are associated with true "vice issues." I have in mind, of course, family law legislation that
might be thought to have primarily a "moral" justification-that is, the kind of legislation which has
been controverted since Mill and Stephen and Hart and Devlin. Such legislation includes some kinds
of statutes regulating entrance into marriage (polygamy and incest statutes, for example), statutes
prohibiting non-marital sexual relations (fornication, cohabitation, adultery, and prostitution
statutes, for example), some kinds of statutes governing reproductive activities (abortion,
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I do not, however, intend (or perhaps need) to take on the entire sweep of
problems privacy rights present; rather, I wish to examine the unexamined.
As the lawyers among my readers will know, constitutional doctrine divides
decisions about statutes challenged in terms of fundamental fourteenth
amendment privacy rights into two parts: First, does the statute infringe some
individual right? Second, is some state interest nevertheless powerful enough
to justify the statute? Most writing about privacy rights is devoted to the
pleasures of identifying, describing, and defending individual rights. The
state-interest side of the constitutional formula is generally scanted. I wish to
redress that balance by investigating the role of the state's interest in
legislation that impinges on privacy rights. In doing so, I will hope to learn
more about the desirability of using the fourteenth amendment to approach
family law problems generally and "vice" issues specifically.
This symposium on vice will attract laymen as well as lawyers. I hope that
this essay will speak to both audiences. However, it has two sections. In the
first-part II-I analyze in conventional legal terms some doctrinal aspects of
the Court's treatment of state interests. Specifically, I examine the Court's
travails in developing tests to use in state-interest analysis, in defining the
terms of those tests, and in applying them. In the essay's second sectionparts III through V-I address rather more speculatively some broader
aspects of a constitutionalized family law. Particularly, I ask whether states
may define their interests in broader terms than the Court has so far
contemplated and whether the Court's constricted state-interest analysis has
had deleterious political and social consequences. Both sections of the essay,
I believe, engage the question ofhow far family law and vice issues should be
constitutionalized, but the first section-because it takes doctrine seriouslymay be of livelier interest to lawyers than to social scientists. Thus, I counsel
the lay reader to consider turning directly to the second section, which begins
at part III.
I undertake this topic with some hesitation. First, it treats only one side of
a two-sided problem: To analyze the state interests in a statute or in the
abstract without assessing the personal rights they confront and without
weighing the two claims against each other is to leave important issues
unexplored and one's ultimate conclusions about rights analysis unformed. 3
Second, the topic is complex, and even in the generous space I have been
permitted, I can only sketch a rough chart of my argument, one devoid of the
cross-currents, eddies, depths, and shoals which are already too blithely and
too hazardously ignored in explorations of constitutional rights. 4
contraception. and adolescent sexual relations), and ~tatutes prohibiting what are understood to be
deviant sexual relations (homosexuality).
3. My own ultimate conclusions about these statutes are indeed incomplete. I have, however,
begun to examine the rights side of the equation in Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia,
76 CALIF. L. REV. 151 (1988).
4. Not only will I be unable to develop fully all the arguments I make, but I will ignore a
number of aspects of state-interest analyses. For example, I will not discuss the extent to which a
legislature must actually have relied on or the state's lawyer actually have advanced a justification for

Page 79: Winter 1988]

CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL ISSUES

81

Perhaps at this point I owe laymen a word of explanation and lawyers a
word of reminder about the doctrinal framework of the fourteenth
amendment doctrine of "substantive due process," for it is that doctrine in
which the right of privacy is embedded. The due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " This clause on its
face seems to create only procedural limits on the power of government, but it
has in two periods in history been taken to impose substantive limits as well.
The first such period was the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
when the Court interpreted the clause as guaranteeing various laissez-faire
economic freedoms, particularly the freedom of contract. 5 The second such
period has been the last twenty years, when the Court has interpreted the
clause as guaranteeing a right to "privacy." Constitutional privacy has an
artificial meaning most easily understood by looking at the specific rights it
has been held to encompass. An authoritative formulation states: "the right
has some extension to activities relating to marriage, ... procreation, ...
contraception, ... family relationships, ... and child rearing and education. " 6
The right to privacy is a "fundamental" right, and statutes that infringe such
rights bear a heavy burden of justification: They must be "necessary" to serve
a "compelling state interest." In contrast, the ordinary run of statutes is
presumed to be constitutional and thus needs only be "rationally related" to a
"permissible state purpose." 7 Generally, the decision which test to apply has
been outcome-determinative. That is, statutes to which the compelling-stateinterest test is applied are almost invariably found unconstitutional; statutes
to which the rationally-related test is applied are almost invariably upheld.

a statute before a court may consider that justification. Nor, to take another example, will I attempt
to canvass all the interests that ought to be "compelling." Nor, again, will I fully e';amine the
interactions between state-interest analysis in privacy cases and in other forms of c.:>nstitutional
adjudication. This piece is, as its title indicates, an essay, not a treatise (or even a law review article):
In it, I reflect on some central features of state-interest analysis; I do not detail and dissect every
feature of it.
5. This period is commonly referred to as the Lochner era, after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1904), in which the Court held that a.statute limiting the working hours of bakery employees (in
order to limit the harmful effects of flour dust on workers) violated the right of employees freely to
contract with employers.
6. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
7. A few fundamental-rights "privacy" cases arise under the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. For our purposes, equal protection analysis closely resembles substantive-dueprocess analysis. Equal protection cases test the legitimacy of legislative classifications that result in
differential treatment of similarly situated people. When a legislative classification implicates a
fundamental right (privacy, in our cases) or when it uses a suspect classification (such as race), it must
be "strictly scrutinized" to see if it meets the same heavy burden of justification used in substantivedue-process analysis. When a legislative classification does not implicate a fundamental right, it need
only meet the light burden of justification. For an illuminating discussion of the Court's use of such
formulaic tests, see Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165 (1985).
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II
AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE-INTEREST TESTS

In this part, I will suggest that the state-interest side of the ·substantivedue-process ledger has generally not been well handled by courts and
commentators: courts have had problems articulating and applying a test;
commentators have scanted those problems. 8 I will suggest that the judicial
awkwardness and scholarly inattention are due to some basic dilemmas of
fourteenth amendment privacy doctrine. To locate those dilemmas, I will
examine three areas of difficulty. The first such area lies in the Supreme
Court's failure to devise a satisfactory standard of review; the second lies in its
failure to decide what its chosen standard of review means; the third lies in its
failure to apply that standard sensitively and sensibly.
A.

The Uncertain Standard of Review

The first area of difficulty with state-interest analysis-the Court's failure
to devise a satisfactory standard of review-is signaled by the fact that the
present standard is less firmly established than one might suppose. Many
recent cases, of course, recite the conventional understanding I described
earlier-that a statute which infringes a "fundamental" right must be
"necessary" to promote a "compelling state interest." However, this test is
something of a novelty in privacy law, and even now it is not regularly used.
The novelty of the modern test is notable enough to warrant a brief history
of the Court's struggles to find a satisfactory standard of review in privacy
cases. The origins of the privacy right lie in the 1920's, in two cases from the
first period of substantive due process-Meyer v. Nebraska 9 and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters 10-each of which involved statutes limiting parents' choices about
their children's education. Meyer and Pierce used the old (and by modern
standards tame) 11 substantive-due-process standard of review: "rights
guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has
no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
8. For one exam:pte of a commentator's treatment, see-the otherwise droll-Note, Fornication,
Cohabitation, and the Constitution, 77 MICH. L. REv. 252 (1978}, which displays the commentator's
typical uninterest in the state-interest problem by managing to spend 45 pages on the fundamentalrights issue and only nine pages on the state's interests. Commentators have, however, devoted
more considerable attention to state-interests aspects of "rationality" review, to, that is, the question
of the kind of review" appropriate to a statute that does not infringe a fundamental right or create a
suspect classification. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I (1972); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEBR. L.
REv. 197 ( 1976); Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: judicial Review and Democratic Theory,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049 (1979); Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1980); Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 487 (1979).
9. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
10. 268 u.s. 510 (1925).
11. It bears emphasizing that the standard of review in the Lochner era (that the law have "a
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state") was, at least in principle,
markedly more forgiving than the modem era's standard.
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State." 12 In 1942, in Skinner v. Oklahoma 13 (an equal protection case not then
thought related to Meyer and Pierce but now sometimes taken to be), the Court
said that, since legislation requiring the sterilization of anyone who
committed three felonies implicated "one of the basic civil rights of man,"
"strict scrutiny" of the classification was necessary. 14 However, strict scrutiny
did not then, as it does now, require courts to use the modern standard of
review; in Skinner it seemed only to mean something more demanding than
the usual degree of deference to legislative decisions. Finally, in the last of
the four early privacy cases, Prince v. Massachusetts, 15 the Court said, "[W]hen
state action impinges upon a claimed religious freedom, it must fall unless
shown to be necessary for or conducive to the child's protection against some
clear and present danger .... " 16 In sum, the early privacy cases introduced
neither the modern rigorous standard of review nor indeed any single
standard of review.
Nor did the compelling-state-interest standard appear in the avatar of the
modern privacy right, Griswold v. Connecticut. 17 Rather, in overturning a statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives, the Griswold Court quoted NAACP v.
Alabama 18 to the effect that a " 'governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.' " 19 Griswold's doctrinal foundation was too ingenious
and too idiosyncratic permanently to support a strong privacy right, and so
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 20 an equal protection case that overturned a statute
regulating the distribution of contraceptives, might seem that right's real
basis. But, like Griswold, Eisenstadt invoked a modest test-that a classification
"must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,
12. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 ( 1925).
13. 316 u.s. 535 (1942).
14. !d. at 541.
15. 321 u.s. 158 (1944).
16. /d. at 167. The presence in the opinion of language generous to the view that parents have
important rights over their children's well-being makes it easy to forget that Prince actually affirmed
the conviction of a guardian who had taken her ward to sell the Watch Tower in violation of child-labor
laws. Prince did so because of the state's expansively described interest in "the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies." !d. at 168.
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold was preceded by Justice Harlan's influential dissent in Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961), a case in which the Court disposed on standing grounds of a
challenge to the same statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives that was reviewed in Griswold.
Justice Harlan reached the substantive question and wrote,
The statute must pass a more rigorous Constitutional test than that going merely to the
plausibility of its underlying rationale .... This enactment involves what ... must be granted to
be a most fundamental aspect of "liberty", ... and it is this which requires that the statute be
subjected to "strict scrutiny". Skinner v. Oklahoma, [316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)] ....
367 U.S. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
18. 377 u.s. 288, 307 (1958).
19. 381 U.S. at 485.
20. 405 u.s. 438 (1972).
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so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. " 21 Perhaps
significantly, it was not until Roe v. Wade, 22 analytically the most problematic
and politically the most controversial of the Court's privacy cases, that the
"modern" test was used: "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved,
the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only
by a 'compelling state interest,' ... and that legislative enactments must be
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." 23
The modern test is not only novel, it is even now not invariably used. In
Zablocki v. Redhail, 24 for example, the Court considered a statute which
required that any non-custodial parent under a support order who wished to
marry show that he had complied with the support order and that his children
were not then and were not likely to become public charges. This statutory
impediment to marriage seemed, as such, to call for the modern standard of
review. However, the Court used a weaker test: "Since our past decisions
make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the
classification at issue here significantly interferes with the exercise of that
right, we believe that 'critical examination' of the state interests advanced in
support of the classification is required." 25
As Zablocki indicates, the Court sometimes fails to invoke the standard its
own doctrine seems to call for. At other times, the Court enunciates no
standard at all. 26 In both situations, explicitly or implicitly, the Court often
seems to be using standards somewhere between the classic rational-basis and
compelling-state-interest standards. The Court's struggles have been
particularly evident in two kinds of cases. The first consists of cases involving
post-Roe statutes that regulate but do not prohibit abortions. Consider, for
instance, some of the earlier cases in that series. In Doe v. Bolton, 27 Roe's
companion case, the Court never avowedly adopted a test, but it repeatedly
used language-"reasonably related," "legitimately related," "rational
connection"-hinting though not establishing that it thought the rationalbasis standard appropriate. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 28 the Court again failed to identify the test it was applying and again
21. !d. at 447 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (in turn quoting Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920))).
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. /d. at 155. Before it decided Roe, the Court decided Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), and again used a test whose articulation suggested that it was less strict than the modern test:
"[A] State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a
balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests .... " /d. at 214. More
strictly, however, the Court also said that "only those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." /d. at 215. The
Court acknowledged that parental "privacy" rights were involved, but did not enunciate a separate
test for them.
24. 434 u.s. 374 (1978).
25. /d. at 383. Even using this less rigorous standard of review, however, the Court found the
statute unconstitutional.
26. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
27. 410 u.s. 179 (1973).
28. 428 u.s. 52 (1976).

Page 79: Winter 1988]

CoNSTITUTIONALIZATION oF SociAL

IssuEs

85

used language-"unreasonable or arbitrary"-consistent in principle with a
rational-basis test. In Carey v. Population Services International, 29 however, the
Court described the post-Roe cases as holding unconstitutional
statutes that did not prohibit abortions outright but limited in a variety of ways a
woman's access to them .... The significance of these cases is that they establish that
the same test must be applied to state regulations that burden an individual's right to
decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access
to the means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit
the decision entirely. Both types of regulation "may be justified only by a 'compelling
state interest' .... " 30

In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 31 the Court again confronted
the standards problem. It said that "restrictive state regulation of the right to
choose abortion ... must be supported by a compelling state interest." 32 But
it also said that "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the
woman's exercise of her right may be permissible where justified by important
state health objectives. " 33 And it added that, after the first trimester, the state
" 'may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation
reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.' " 34
I will not weary the reader by trying to work out whether all these varying
standards can in some technical way be reconciled with each other or with the
assumptions of fundamental-rights analysis. It is perhaps enough to say that
these tests have not been coherently applied in subsequent post-Roe cases
(although the standard of review seems to be tightening). Indeed, in the
recent case of Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 35
the Court once again neglected to announce which test it planned to apply.
And further complicating the issue, now as before, the question whether the
standard the Court invokes is the standard the Court actually uses in resolving
these cases.
The other category of cases in which the Court has particularly struggled
to find a state-interest standard consists of cases involving nonstandard rightholders like minors and prisoners. In Carey v. Population Services International, 36
a case involving access to contraceptives by both minors and adults, the Court
began by invoking the compelling-state-interest test but later wrote, "State
restrictions inhibiting privacy interests of minors are valid only if they serve
'any significant state interest ... that is not present in the case of an adult.' " 37
In Bellotti v. Baird, 38 the Court asked whether a parental consent statute
29. 431 U.S. 678 (1976). Carey, though, was a contraception, not an abortion, case.
30. /d. at 688.
31. 462 u.s. 416 (1983).
32. /d. at 427.
33. /d. at 430.
34. /d. at 430-31 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)).
35. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
36. 431 u.s. 678 (1977).
37. /d. at 693 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)).
The Court added, "This test is apparently less rigorous than the 'compelling state interest' test
applied to restrictions on the privacy rights of adults." /d. at 693 n.l5.
38. 433 u.s. 622 (1979).
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"unduly burden[ed]" the minor's right to seek an abortion. 39 And the Court
in H.L. v. Matheson 40 upheld a parental notification requirement against a
minor's constitutional challenge because it "serves important state interests,
is narrowly drawn to protect only those interests, and does not violate any
guarantees of the Constitution." 41 Finally, in Turner v. Safley, 42 a case
involving the right of prison inmates to marry, the Court, emphasizing that it
was dealing with a "prisoner's rights" case, said that a regulation severely
limiting a prisoner's right to marry "is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests." 43 In short, the announced standard in cases
involving nonstandard rightholders is at least as volatile as the standard in the
post-Roe cases, and the doubts about the correspondence between the test
invoked and the test actually used are at least as pronounced.
The novelty of the "modern" test and the inconstancy of its application
are perhaps not astonishing, given the novelty and uncertain scope of the
privacy doctrine itself. In any event, the inconstancy should be measured
against the baseline of inconstancy that is common in legal doctrines in
complex and controversial areas. Furthermore, the degree of inconstancy has
in one sense been moderated (albeit confusingly) by the Court's occasional
willingness to announce a relatively mild test while actually applying the
modern test. 44 However, the novelty and inconstancy of the modern test are
noteworthy because they give us our first hint of the extraordinary difficulty of
state-interest analysis in fundamental-rights privacy cases. That difficulty can
begun to be understood by briefly exploring some of the reasons for the
novelty and inconstancy. I infer that the modern test was late in coming and
that it is sometimes ignored because of two factors: first, the Court's
uncertainty about the right to privacy itself and about how far it may take the
Court; second, the Court's unwillingness to treat state interests as strong
enough to overcome rights.
The Court's uncertainty about the right of privacy is evidenced by the
continuing obscurity of the term "privacy" and of the right that term
describes. The Court has avoided defining the right; rather, it has preferred
to proceed analogically. The right is most easily rationalized in broad Millian
terms, and commentators have widely done so. 45 The Court, however, has
not; 46 but neither has it provided an alternative interpretation. Some of the
Court's reluctance to define the privacy right may spring from the fact that
39. !d. al 640.
40. 450 U.S. 405 (1981).
41. !d. al 413.
42. 107 S. CL. 2254 (1987).
43. !d. aL 2261.
44. Eisensladl v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 384 (1978), come
readily Lo mind. This willingness Lo announce one slandard while applying anolher is nol
uncommon in equal proleCLion cases. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cenler, 473 U.S. 432
(1985).
45. For a survey of commenlalors, see Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1980, al 83.
46. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Grey, supra nole 45; Burl, The Constitution
of the Family, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 329.
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attempts to define it must provoke an unwelcome re-examination of many
complex and controversial questions about constitutional interpretation and
judicial review. The heart of the problem, though, is probably that privacy is a
"greedy" concept47 whose core principle seems endlessly expansive. The
Court itself slips easily into paraphrasing the privacy right as the even broader
"right to be let alone." The unconfrontable problem, then, becomes finding
principles to limit the right of privacy. 48 Those limiting principles cannot be
found in the text of the Constitution (since it never speaks of a right to
privacy) nor in the intent of the Framers of the fourteenth amendment (since
they did not contemplate a right to privacy) nor in a judicial definition of the
right of privacy (since the Court has not seriously attempted to construct
one). Indeed, the Court has rejected one limiting principle-the idea that
privacy is the right to do what you want with your own body-because it was
not limiting enough. 49 Nevertheless, the need for limiting principles is
palpable: the right to be let alone is ultimately the right not to be governed.
The absence of a limiting principle has apparently concerned the Court in
at least two respects. First, the Court has long anticipated that some family
law regulations-like those prohibiting sodomy-seem to affront core privacy
principles but are so deeply rooted in American history, law, moral belief, and
popular sentiment that the Court will not overturn them. 50 Second, family
law regulates some parts of family life extensively yet unproblematically. As
the Court wrote in Zablocki:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean to
suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or
prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary,
reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into
the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed. 51

Yet in the absence of a limiting principle to privacy, it is hard for the Court to
explain why the privacy doctrine should not be applied with its usual severity
in both areas, or indeed in many others.
The lack of a definition of and limiting principles to the privacy doctrine
puts pressure on state-interest analysis, since one obvious solution to the
problem of a too-expansive privacy doctrine is to allow the state interests in
such regulations to override the privacy right. For instance, one solution to
·the uncertain dimensions of the rights of nonstandard right-bearers would be
to acknowledge a state interest either in protecting the right-bearers (as with
minors) or in protecting society against the right-bearers (as with prisoners).
That solution, however, has been barred by the virtually outcomedeterminative nature of the question whether a fundamental right is at stake.
That is, in the privacy context, the modern test has proved so strict that a
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Freund, Privacy, in PRIVACY (Nomos XIII) (J. Pennock
See Schneider, supra note 3; Note, supra note 8.
Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
434 u.s. 384, 386 (1978).

&J. Chapman eds. 1971).
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statute that must meet it stands little chance of being found constitutional. 5 2
The Court's slowness to adopt and reluctance to adhere to the modern test
may, then, have been an attempt to preserve flexibility in handling the
intricate and puzzling problems with which family law deals while retaining
the two-tier test and its accompanying doctrinal tools. 53
The two-tier test has been much assailed by academics andjudges because
of its rigidity, and in equal protection cases the Court has responded to the
problem by adopting a third tier of intermediate scrutiny. 54 I have tried to
show how, in the privacy area, that rigidity indeed exists and indeed has
driven the Court to doctrinal confusion and sub rosa adjustments of its
standards. However, the two-tier approach has virtues, and its alternatives
have faults. Its first virtue is that it is professedly an attempt to limit the
damage done to the majoritarian principle by judicial review, since its purpose
is to preserve a large area within which legislatures have the considerable
liberty granted them by the rational-basis standard. The two-tiered
approach's second virtue is that it promotes simplicity and predictability of
decision. The primary alternative to the two-tiered approach, on the other
hand, is to balance the right against the state interest case by case. Since
personal rights and state interests are incommensurable, it is hard to see what
52. Roe v. Wade was the only privacy case in which a state successfully asserted that its interests
were compelling. When the Court has wished to uphold a regulation, it has generally done so by
interpreting the right narrowly rather than finding that the state interest overcomes the right. In
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), for instance, the Court upheld a state regulation permitting
Medicaid payments only for "medically necessary" abortions. The Court avoided applying the
modem test by concluding "that the Connecticut regulation does not impinge upon the fundamental
right recognized in Roe." !d. at 474. And, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court
sustained a state law prohibiting homosexual sodomy. The Court avoided applying the modem test
by interpreting the earlier privacy cases and concluding that those cases would not "extend a
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy." /d. at 192. For
information about the larger background of these issues, see Professor Gunther's influential·
discussion of the .two-tier problem in the context of equal protection. Gunther, supra note 8.
53. The rigidity of substantive-due-process analysis contrasts illuminatingly with the
comparative flexibility of procedural-due-process analysis. As we have seen, a finding that a statute
conflicts with a substantive fundamental right generally means the statute will be held
unconstitutional. In contrast, comparatively little need turn on the finding of a right to procedural
due process: The Court has often interpreted the requirements of due process flexibly, in ways that
are relatively sensitive both to the variety of personal interests at stake and to the different
institutional contexts in which the state acts. Thus, instead of invariably requiring trial-likeprocedures, the Court has held, for example, that the ordinary admittance and retention procedures
of a state mental hospital could provide due process to children involuntarily committed by their
parents. Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
The standard criteria for evaluating due process issues make the flexibility of procedural-dueprocess analysis plain, for in determining what process is due, the Court overtly weighs the private
interests, the governmental interest, and the risk that the procedures in use will produce incorrect
decisions. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 ( 1976). The flexibility of due process lies not only in
the freedom it allows in shaping remedies to the nature of the right, but (somewhat less attractively)
in the fact that it often allows courts to avoid making'hard decisions about the scope of the right. See
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). Of course, the
Court need not use this flexibility. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Similarly, one
advantage (the virtue of its fault) of the Lochner era's formulation of the state-interest test (a
"reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state") was that it gave courts a
flexibility that modem substantive-due-process law does not.
54. See Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown in the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHio ST.
L.J. 161 (1984).
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principle would guide courts if balancing were substituted for two-tier
analysis, and one supposes pressure would build to develop such a principle.
Since commentators have not proffered a principle, one wonders how much
of an improvement it might be. Furthermore, ad hoc balancing offers no
institutionalized protection for the majoritarian principle, and for that matter,
offers no institutionalized protection for the right to privacy. 55
In sum, then, we have seen in this part a Court struggling to find a
standard to apply in state-interest analysis. We have seen that even when the
Court articulated a standard, it could not bring itself to apply it consistently.
We have seen that these problems derive from the inability of the Court to
define the doctrine of privacy and to infer from the definition a limiting
principle. The absence of such a principle puts considerable pressure on
state-interest analysis to provide limits on the privacy doctrine. How well
state-interest analysis responds will depend in part on the clarity and
usefulness of the terms its test employs. To that subject we now turn.
B.

The Uncertain Meaning of the Standard's Terms

I have been arguing that the first difficulty with the Supreme Court's stateinterest analysis has been its ambivalence in selecting a standard of review.
The second difficulty is its unwillingness to define the standard's component
terms. The first of these terms, of course, is that the legislation be
"necessary" to serve the state interest. But what is necessary? How effective,
for example, does the statute have to be? Effective as compared to what? As
compared to the normal run of statutes, or as compared to some absolute
standard? How is effectiveness to be measured? Given the state of the social
sciences and the limits of social resources, can effectiveness be measured?
Because "necessary" is undefined, questions of this sort could be multiplied
indefinitely. In the absence of definitions, then, we must turn to the Court's
holdings to construe the term's meaning.
In privacy cases, the Court has largely handled questions of "necessity"
not by directly assessing a statute's effectiveness, but rather by devising and
deploying two categories of "non-necessity." In the first of these categories,
the Court finds that a statute is not "necessary" because some alternative and
constitutionally inoffensive statute would serve the state's purpose. In
principle, this formula is appealing. In practice, there have been important
unanswered questions. How far, for instance, does the state have to go to find
alternatives? How is the effectiveness of the alternative to be judged? What if
the alternative would cost substantially more, either economically or socially?
What if it would work less well? What if its chances of success are purely
55. Professor Gunther's solution, see supra note 8, is to allow for rational-basis scrutiny with
bite, but to allow the court only to evaluate means, not ends. This solution has the virtue of relieving
courts of the problem of comparing incommensurables and of providing some institutionalized
protection for the majoritarian principle. However, courts would still be left with the difficulties of
evaluating means which I will describe in part II.B. infra, and, since virtually every statute that has
been invalidated on privacy grounds was invalidated on means and not ends grounds, his proposal
might make little difference in privacy cases.
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speculative? Because the Court does not examine alternatives with anything
like the energy it devotes to challenged statutes, we are hard put to answer
such questions.
The difficulty with the "alternatives" principle in the privacy context has in
part to do with a particular feature of family law: In it, enforcement problems
are as pervasive and intractable as anywhere in the law. 56 The severity of
these enforcement problems makes the availability of alternatives less
meaningful and may make necessary the cumulative use of several kinds of
enforcement measures. For example, in Zablocki 57 the Court said that "the
State already has numerous other means for exacting compliance with
support obligations, means, that are at least as effective as the instant statute's
and yet do not impinge upon the right to marry." 58 The Court listed wage
assignments, civil contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties. 59 These
alternatives were in fact part of Wisconsin's law, but they had been notably
ineffective. 60 Even the most vigorous, systematic, and successful states do
badly at enforcing child-support obligations. 61 Further, many statutes
attempt to deal with several related social problems at once. A satisfactory
alternative should presumably deal with all the problems the challenged
statute dealt with. For instance, the alternatives to the Zablocki statute (wage
assignments, civil contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties) all were
aimed at men who could afford to pay but refused to; the Zablocki statute, on
the other hand, tried in part to prevent men from becoming unable to pay
their current child support because they had assumed new financial
responsibilities and in part to prevent men from incurring new child-support
56. For a brief summary of the multitude of reasons for this, see Schneider, The Next Step:
Definition, Generalization, and Theory in American Family Law, 18 U. MICH.]. L. REF. 1039, 1056 (1985).
57. For a description of Zablocki, see supra text accompanying note 24.
58. 434 u.s. 374, 389 ( 1978).
59. !d. at 390. The Court never asked whether, since the successful enforcement of the financial
obligations (like alimony or child support) of one marriage would also presumably deter some
people from taking on similar new obligations, these alternatives might also "impinge upon the right
to marry."
60. Ironically, the first major study of child-support enforcement policies investigated Dane
County, Wisconsin (the county containing Madison, the state capital). Eckhardt, Social Change,
Legal Controls, and Child Support: A Study in the Sociology of Law (Ph.D. diss., University of
Wisconsin 1965). As Professor Chambers reports,
Eckhardt found that in the first year under the support order, 40 percent of fathers made no
payments whatever. By the seventh year, over 70 percent were making no payments. Over the
seven-year period, the mean level of payments by all fathers seems to have been no higher than
about 30 percent of everything they owed.
D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY 72 (1979).
61. In Genesee County, Michigan, an unusually successful county in an unusually successful
state (an administrative agency, the Friend of the Court, helps pursue delinquents, and courts use jail
readily), 24% of the fathers who owed child support were paying 10% or less of the ordered amount
in the sixth year of the order; 18% were paying between 10% and 80%; and 58% were paying 80%
or more of the ordered payment. D. CHAMBERS, supra note 60, at 77. Using the world, not the
United States, as the point of comparison, one scholar concludes that "even a very efficient support
system has its limits . . . . About 15 percent of Swedish divorced parents liable for support pay
nothing, while 25 percent pay less than 30 percent of what they owe." M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 88-89 (1987).
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obligations which they could not meet. 62 In short, alternatives are rarely
likely to be fully satisfactory substitutes. Indeed, even the challenged
statutory device and all the alternatives combined may often not fully achieve
the legislative purpose (or, more often and more problematically, purposes).
In. that sense, the challenged device may indeed be a necessary, if only
incremental, step.6 3
The Court's second (and related) category of "non-necessity" has to do
with "fit" (with whether a legislative classification is over- or underinclusive).
Fit, of course, is an idea used primarily in equal-protection analysis, where the
absence of fit may indicate that one group has been singled out for special
benefits or burdens. However, fit works awkwardly in fundamental-rights
cases, even when, as in Eisenstadt and Zablocki, fundamental-rights analysis is
clothed in the garb of equal protection. True, the "overinclusiveness" part of
fit analysis may in principle be appropriate. A statute that infringes
fundamental rights more broadly than is truly necessary to accomplish all the
state's purposes surely is undesirable. 64 But "underinclusiveness," while
relevant to equal-protection analysis because it hints that a favored group is
excusing itself from the burden of a statute, seems irrelevant to privacy cases.
Consider, for example, the underinclusiveness argument in Zablocki. There,
the Court noted that the statute "does not limit in any way new financial
commitments by the applicant other than those ansmg out of the
contemplated marriage." 65 But why is this troublesome? Quite aside from
the many reasons for singling out the costs arising out of a contemplated
marriage, 66 why is it a fault that the statute does not go as far in restricting
62. It was presumably also aimed at compelling regular payment by divorced men who wished to
remarry or to be free to do so.
63. Zablocki reveals another problem with means analysis: the difficulty of measurement. Means
analysis requires, in principle, that courts be able to decide whether a statute is effectively serving its
purpose. But even under the best of circumstances, this inquiry will be brutally difficult. Suppose
that a statutory prohibition is never violated. It will be impossible to say that the statute is successful
because it will be impossible to say that the people would not have behaved as they were directed to
even in the absence of a statute. Suppose, on the other hand, that a statutory prohibition is often
violated. It will be impossible to measure the effect of the statute because there will be no way of
knowing whether even more people would have behaved even more undesirably in the absence of a
prohibitory statute. For example, a failure to punish the improper behavior might have encouraged
improper behavior by allowing people to think that, because the behavior was not punished, it was
not disapproved. These problems may be particularly acute in an area like Zablocki's, since a
widespread sense that other ex-husbands are not keeping up their payments might lead men to ask,
"Why should I pay if nobody else does?" To put the point differently, one important, but
unmeasurable, function of a statute may be to reinforce the beliefs and behavior of those who are
already acting properly.
64. It is not clear that the "overinclusiveness" problem is different from the "alternatives"
problem. Thus, the same limits to the "alternatives" approach I catalogued above may apply to
"overinclusiveness" approaches.
65. 434 u.s. 374, 390 (1978).
6q. Costs arising out of a contemplated marriage might be singled out for special treatment
because, for example, (I) they are likely to be specially great, (2) they are likely to be costs which last
a particularly long time, (3) they are likely to be costs which cannot and ought not be escaped, and
(4) they are costs that it is particularly easy for the state to regulate through its control over marriage
licenses. Furthermore, the prohibition in Zablocki was presumably designed not just to protect the
delinquent's existing children and former spouse, but to protect the delinquent's future children and
future spouse. The regulation seems neatly tailored for that purpose, enforcement problems aside.
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liberty as it might? What would a statute that was not underinclusive look
like? Would it not be socially and perhaps constitutionally more offensive than
the challenged statute?67
Problems with using fit also arise when the Court assesses each of a
statute's several purposes without considering the ways in which the
legislature must moderate its pursuit of one goal in order to serve others as
well. This is what Professor Nagel, in his incisive student note, calls the
"divide and conquer" tactic. 68 His analysis of Eisenstadt v. Baird illustrates this
flaw in "fit" reasoning. The Massachusetts statute in Eisenstadt prohibited the
distribution of contraceptives except for prophylactic purposes or except to
married couples by prescription. The Court said that the statute was
discriminatory and overbroad because, "'[i]f there is a need to have a
physician prescribe . . . contraceptives, the need is as great for unmarried
persons as for married persons.' " 69 But, Professor Nagel observes, another
purpose of the statute was to discourage premarital sex, which accounts for
the different treatment of the married and unmarried. The Court noted
further that some contraceptives were available if they could be used for
prophylaxis. Professor Nagel responds that this was not evidence of the
statute's insincerity, as the Court seemed to think, since the statute sought to
restrict access to contraceptives only insofar as that was consistent with
another statutory purpose-promoting public health. Finally, the Court held
that the statute violated the equal protection clause because of the exception
for married couples. Professor Nagel argues, however, that this exception was
drawn in recognition (probably constitutionally required after Griswold v.
Connecticut) of the right to marital privacy. In sum, Professor Nagel concludes
that, by testing the statutory purposes in isolation from each other, the Court
missed the complexity of the true statutory purpose and therefore could not
properly evaluate whether the statute's means fit its ends:
The legislature's overall purpose might have been defined as follows: to discourage
premarital sex by making contraceptives harder to obtain to the extent that this would
not increase the risks of venereal disease; to provide for the medical supervision of the
distribution of contraceptives to the extent that this would not increase the availability
of contraceptives to the unmarried; and to discourage the use of contraceptives to the
extent that this would not interfere with the private behavior of married persons.
Unless it is "irrational" per se for a legislature to design a statute to achieve a set of
somewhat conflicting policy objectives, the Massachusetts statute would appear to
have been rational. 70

Having glimpsed some of the difficulties of defining "necessary," let us
move now to the second undefined term in the Court's standard for deciding
privacy cases-the requirement that statutes infringing privacy rights serve a
67. The Court has used "fit" reasoning in similarly puzzling ways in other areas. See Schn,eider,
Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1227, 1285-86 (1986).
68. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 127 (1972).
69. 405 U.S. 438,450 (1972) (quoting Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 758,247 N.E.2d
574, 581 (1969) (Whittemore & Cutter, JJ., dissenting)).
70. Note, supra note 68, at 127-28.
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"compelling state interest." What is "compelling"? The term has no intrinsic
meaning. On the contrary, it is classically a term of imprecision in literary
criticism, the term critics use when they liked the book, but can't quite figure
out why. Yet the Court has sedulously avoided defining it. Of course, judges
frequently leave the definition of a test to case law which gradually reveals and
refines the test's meaning. However, since Roe v. Wade is the only privacy case
that acknowledged a compelling state interest, we are left with the
information that protecting a pregnant woman's health after the first trimester
and protecting fetal life after the second trimester are compelling state
interests. But since the Court barely explains why these are compelling state
interests or why each interest is not compelling at an earlier stage of
pregnancy,7 1 we are left with only a shallow understanding of "compelling"
state interests.
It might, of course, be thought that the kinds of statutes at issue in privacy
cases are simply unlikely ever to implicate state interests of any significance,
that they are mere attempts to "legislate morality. " 72 But that is not so. The
purpose of the statute overridden in Zablocki, for instance, was in part to
improve the often intolerable circumstances of divorced women and their
children. Recent evidence suggests that, even where former husbands
faithfully make alimony and child-support payments, former wives and their
children are more severely disadvantaged economically by divorce than their
former husbands. 73 And since those payments are widely not made, the
state's interest in alleviating their misery is urgent. 74 In Roe v. Wade, to take an
example of a different sort, it was not easy to understand why the scope of the
"compelling" state interest was not even greater than the Court conceded.
The Court there said that fetal life in the first two trimesters is "potential life."
It did not explain why potential human life may not be of compelling interest
71. The Court's explanations of when both interests become compelling may be given in their
entirety:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the
"compelling" point ... is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of
the now-established medical fact ... that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion
may be less than mortality in normal childbirth.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 ( 1973). Yet it is hard to see why that medical fact indicates that the
state does not have an interest in preventing whatever mortality and whatever morbidity may occur in
first trimester pregnancies.
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the "compelling"
point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb.
/d. at 163. We are not told, however, what "meaningful" means or why fetal life before the third
trimester-which the Court stipulates is at least "potential life"-may not be of compelling interest
to the state.
72. For a brief comment on whether "legislating morality" is a legitimate state interest, see infra
note 93 and accompanying text.
73. See generally D. CHAMBERS, supra note 60; L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SoCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQ.UENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985);
T. ARENDELL, MoTHERS AND DIVORCE: LEGAL, EcoNOMIC, AND SociAL DILEMMAS (1986).
74. The Court in Zablocki, of course, did not say that these interests were not important; it did
not reach that question, since it found the statute "unnecessary" to serve the state purpose. 434 U.S.
at 388.
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to a state (nor did it satisfactorily explain why a state could not reasonably
conclude that it was protecting not just potential, but actual, human life).
Since the law usually regards human life as the ultimate value, such an
explanation seems called for. To take a final kind of example, in some privacy
cases the state interest is to effectuate privacy rights that might otherwise be
. destroyed. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 75 for instance,
the Court held unconstitutional a statute that required minors to have
parental consent to an abortion. The Court saw the requirement as the
delegation of a state veto to the parents, and thus as unconstitutional. But the
parents' interest in directing the upbringing and defining and ensuring the
welfare of their children is itself a fundamental right and therefore, one might
suppose, a compelling state interest. 76
The ambiguities I have been discussing are aggravated by the uncertainty
whether "compelling" is an absolute or a relative term. That is, may the
strength of the state interest vary with the strength of the fundamental right,
so that a weak fundamental right may be infringed by a weak compelling state
interest? Similarly, is "necessary" an absolute term, or does it vary with the
strength of the right or with the strength of the state interest? The language
of the test suggests that these terms are not relative, that an interest is either
compelling or it isn't, that a statute is either necessary to serve an interest or it
isn't. Moreover, the Court has never avowedly treated "compelling" or
"necessary" as relative terms, and when it has wished to uphold a statute, it
has struggled to find that no fundamental right is affected and thus that the
question whether the state's interest is compelling may be avoided, a struggle
that might often be unnecessary were the test's terms relative. 77 Finally,
making "necessary" and "compelling" absolute and not relative terms helps
courts escape balancing the right against the state interest, a consumation
devoutly to be wished, given that the two are incommensurable.
Nevertheless, it is easy to think that, particularly in an area of regulation as
intricate as family law, some exercises of a fundamental right will be trivial
and ought to be regulable with only modest justification. This, indeed, is what
the quotation from Zablocki (that not "every state regulation which relates in
any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to
rigorous scrutiny") implies. 78 Further, the Court in Roe v. Wade seemed to be
using just such a sliding scale in its scheme of increasing levels of permissible
regulation in each succeeding trimester. Finally, cases involving minors and
75. 428 u.s. 52, 72-75 (1976).
76. On similar grounds, the Court in Danforth invalidated a spousal-consent provision. If such a
provision is seen not as the delegation of state power but, as Justice White saw it in dissent, 428 U.S.
at 93, as the state's recognition of the father's privacy right in making decisions about procreation,
then, given the importance the Court has anributed to such rights, the state's interest seems
compelling. This kind of state interest (that is, an interest in promoting the privacy rights of one
among several competing individuals) is particularly likely to arise in cases involving conflicts
between parents and children. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). I discuss the
frequency of such conflicts and the dilemmas they represent in Schneider, supra note 3.
77. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
78. 434 u.s. 374, 386 (1978).

Page 79: Winter 1988]

CoNSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SociAL IssuEs

95

prisoners can be understood as allowing heightened state regulation because
of the relatively weak privacy rights involved. In short, there are reasonable
arguments on both sides of the question whether "compelling" and
"necessary" are relative terms, a fact which exacerbates the ambiguities I have
been describing.
These doubts about whether the terms of the test are relative or absolute
go back once again to the Court's failure to define the privacy right. That
right apparently encompasses widely various kinds of situations (from entry
into marriage, to parental decisions about children's education, to abortion),
and even within a single situation the nature and intensity of the personal
interest can vary radically. If "necessary" and "compelling" are absolute
terms, the Court must encounter the awkward problem of dealing with
fundamental rights that protect both vital and trivial personal interests. In
contrast, consider equal protection cases involving race. The country's
historical experience with racial discrimination, the harshness of the need to
repudiate that experience, and the cruel injury racial discrimination inflicts
provide some common level of seriousness to equal protection rights. That
commonality makes it plausible to require a compelling state interest
whenever a statute infringes the equal protection rights of a racial minority.
The absence of any such commonality makes that standard awkward in privacy
cases when relatively modest interests are defended with the full arsenal of a
fundamental right.
•
In sum, state-interest analysis in fourteenth amendment privacy cases has
been marked by repeated failures of definition, by failures to define either a
standard or its component terms. These failures bespeak, I think, the Court's
unwillingness or inability to decide what it meant to do when it began to
constitutionalize family law, the difficulties of setting coherent yet reasonably
simple and workable judicial policy in an area as multifarious as family law and
in a country as various as ours, and the problems with assessing the
desirability and effectiveness of legislation in family law. At the last of these,
we now take a closer look.
C.

The Uncertain Handling of Empirical Evidence

I observed above that the absence of a limiting principle to the right to
privacy puts pressure on state-interest analysis, which takes on most of the
burden of limiting that right. Our study of the terms of the Court's test for
evaluating state interests concluded, however, that state-interest analysis as
the court developed it is ill-equipped to sustain that pressure. Thus, the
weakness of state-interest analysis in turn puts pressure on the definition of
the fundamental right. Nevertheless, if the Court's handling of each case were
probing and perceptive, these reciprocal pressures might be somewhat
alleviated. The Court's performance, however, has generally been clumsy and
obtuse. My criticisms here have particularly to do with the Court's treatment
of empirical problems. Showing that a statute isn't "necessary" to promote
the legislature's purpose raises empirical questions of the most elaborate and
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perplexing kind. Yet the Court consistently prefers a priori reasoning to
marshalling and analyzing empirical evidence. I believe this problem is
important, but since I have explored the Court's aversion to empirical
evidence elsewhere,79 I will not expatiate on it here.
There are, of course, many reasons for the Court's perfunctory and
dismissive treatment of empirical issues. The most sympathetic is that social
scientists often have not studied a problem, or have not studied it in ways that
speak to the policy issues courts confront. Another sympathetic reason is that
the issues are so complex and impenetrable that even skillful studies
commonly produce tentative, partial, and unhelpful results. 8 ° Further,
lawyers often fail to adduce what social science evidence there is, and courts
are generally unequipped to use it well. 81 But courts also are crippled by what
I have called their hyper-rationalism-"the belief that reason can reliably be
used to infer facts where evidence is unavailable or incomplete." 82 More
specifically:
In its first aspect, [hyper-rationalism] is the assumption that systematic evidence is
generally superfluous to understanding social problems, since the behavior of people
and institutions can be logically inferred from a general understanding of how people
and institutions work. In its second aspect, it is the assumption that, in the absence of
a general understanding of how people and institutions work, anecdotal evidence is
generally sufficient, since the behavior of people and institutions can be logically
inferred from a few examples of their actual behavior under the relevant
circumstances. In its third aspect, it is the assumption that a description of social
reality articulated in one case may be taken as demonstrated fact in subsequent cases;
it is, in other words, the application of stare decisis to evidence about social behavior. 83

In sum, the reciprocal pressure that a poorly defined privacy right and a
poorly constructed state-interest analysis place on each other is exacerbated
by the Court's regularly superficial and inept treatment of empirical
problems. But to have concluded that the doctrinal structure of state-interest
analysis is infirm leaves unremarked several further doctrinal weaknesses and
a number of considerations that go beyond doctrine. To these and to their
consequences for the constitutionalization of social issues we now turn.
79. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 919
(1986).
80. For two excellent reviews of the social science literature on issues relating to child-custody
decisions, both reaching this kind of conclusion about the literature, see Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative
Reform of Child Custody Adjudication: An Effort to Rely on Social Science Data in Formulating Legal Policies, 4
LAw & Soc'v REv. 167 (1969); Chambers, Rethinking the Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH.
L. REv. 477 (1984). For an extended and thoughtful examination of the problems involved in
designing and carrying out social science research intended to answer policy questions, seeM. WALD,
j. CARLSMrrH & P. LEIDERMAN, PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN (1988).
81. See Davis, "There is a Book Out . .. ": An Analysis of judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987).
82. Schneider, supra note 79, at 932.
83. /d. at 932-33 (footnotes omitted). For a detailed and telling examination of how courts have
dealt with empirical problems in various kinds of fourteenth amendment cases involving children,
seeR. MNOOKIN, R. BuRT, D. CHAMBERS, M. WALD, S. SuGARMAN, F. ZIMRING & R. SoLOMON, IN THE
INTEREST OF CHILDREN (1985}, particularly part IV, which contains Professor Mnookin's incisive
analysis of the judicial treatment of the policy issues in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 ( 1976). For an
insightful and broader examination of rationalism in constitutional analysis, see Nagel, Rationalism in
Constitutional Law, 4 CoNST. COMMENT 9 (1987).
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III
A

DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE ON STATE INTERESTS:
THE SOCIALIZING STRATEGY

In part II, I made three criticisms of the Court's state-interest analysis.
These criticisms seem to me important not just on their own merits, but
because each of them reflects serious difficulties with the principle of
fourteenth amendment privacy. I now wish to investigate some of those
difficulties from a different perspective by exploring more generally the kinds
of justifications a state may legitimately advance in support of a statute said to
violate a fourteenth amendment privacy right. My discussion begins with the
general observation that the Court often looks at the particular situation a
case presents in isolation from its legal and social context and often looks at
the challenged statute in isolation from other statutes and from other forms of
social regulation. Seen in these two, related, kinds of isolation, many of these
statutes seem to serve weak, to say nothing of compelling, interests. Seen in
these kinds of isolation, many of these statutes appear under- or overinclusive. But seeing these statutes in isolation is troublesome, for reasons
that repay extended inquiry.
Let me illustrate the first kind of isolation-the isolation of the particular
fact situation from its larger social setting-with a case from the Colorado
Supreme Court. In Israel v. Allen, 84 a brother and sister related only by
adoption and not by blood wished to marry. Colorado law expressly forbad
such marriages. The court's opinion began, "Since we find . . . that the
provision prohibiting marriage between adopted children fails even to satisfy
minimum rationality requirements, we need not determine whether a
fundamental right is infringed by this statute." 85 The state had reasoned that
the statute furthered an interest in "family harmony," but the court replied
that, because there were no special genetic risks to such a marriage and
because the " 'natural repugnance of people toward marriages of blood
relatives ... is quite generally lacking in application to the union of those
related only by affinity,' " there could be no logical reason for barring this
couple from marriage. 86 The court therefore ruled in favor of the brother and
sister.
The Israel's "family harmony" may indeed have been undisturbed, but
surely the state's argument was not addressed just to that particular family.
Rather, the state presumably meant that "family harmony" in society
generally was promoted by keeping the possibility of sexual relations between
family members as far from their minds as possible ..S 7 In brief, the legislature
sought to reinforce the incest taboo. It sought to do so by making marriage
84. 195 Colo. 263, 577 P.2d 763 (Colo. 1978).
85. !d. at 265, 577 P.2d at 764.
86. /d. at 764 (quoting I VERNIER, AMERICAN fAMILY LAws 183 (1931)).
87. When one of my classes was discussing Israel, a student said (in a voice rich with discovery),
"If I'd known brothers and sisters married each other, I would have looked at my brother in a whole
different way."
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between any people in the relation of siblings entirely unthinkable, not just
unthinkable for actual siblings. Taboos do not work rationally; they work by
inducing reactions of horror and disgust at the prohibited practice. Rational
analysis of taboos is not only likely to miss this point, but even itself to weaken
the taboo. Once you begin to think about which kinds of incest-like activities
lack particular identifiable harmful consequences for particular identifiable
participants, you begin to think about the unthinkable and about why some
"incest" is harmless incest. As this process continues, the emotional force of
the taboo, its force as a general deterrent, is eroded. Thus, by failing to
understand that the statutory prohibition was part of a larger social
prohibition which served a larger social purpose than preventing the
disruption of particular families, the court misunderstood the nature and
mechanics of the state's interest and underestimated its strength (and its
ultimate rationality). 88
The second (and related) kind of isolation in which courts tend to see
statutes-the isolation of statutes from their larger legal context-may be
introduced by a more troublesome case, one in which the state's position
seems merely anachronistic and the Court's position seems at least stronger
than the court's in Israel. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court confronted a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution (not, as in Griswold, the use)
of contraceptives. In considering the statute's justifications, the Court quoted
a 1917 opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court which said that
the law's " 'plain purpose is to protect purity, to preserve chastity, to
encourage continence and self restraint, to defend the sanctity of the home,
and thus to engender in the State and nation a virile and virtuous race of men
and women.' " 89 The Court responded to this quaint avowal by noting that
the statute allowed married couples access to contraceptives and by reasoning
that Massachusetts could not have intended to make pregnancy a punishment
for the mere misdemeanor of fornication. The Court thus found the statute
unconstitutional. This was, no doubt, an uncommonly silly law. 90
Nevertheless, the Court unduly limited its understanding of the state interest
by seeing the statute in isolation.
The problem Eisenstadt illustrates is that a statute may be intended as part
of a system oflegal (and non-legal) regulation of social behavior. Family law, as
I noted above, is distinguished by the ubiquity and intensity of its
enforcement difficulties. Because family law regulates conduct that occurs in
private, because regulating private conduct can produce undesired and
undetectable consequences, and because familial conduct is often motivated
by fiercely powerful drives, family law-traditionally and presently-operates
88. My argument is not intended to be dispositive of Israel. The remaining question is whether
Martin and Tammy Israel should have to bear the (for them disproportionate) cost of maintaining
the incest taboo.
89. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass.
57, 62, 116 N.E. 265, 266 (1917)).
90. Justice Stewart wrote this of the statute in his dissent to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 527 (1965).

